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In The (jjh/~~ 
SUPREME COURT ./ -tf'- - -- -
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IN THE SUFS~1.:E COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STAT~ OF "ITTAJI, 
Plai~1ti ff and Respondent, 
vs. 
Fl.TJI. OLSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 6241 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
-,----------
Statement. 
This is an appeel from the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah 
in and tor Duchesne County. The defendant 
was charged in an Information filed by the 
District Attorney with the crime of carnal 
knowledge committed upon the body of one 
Ruth Dhanens. The jury returned a verdict of 
gu!lty, and the defendant was sentenced by the 
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court to serve a term of from one to five 
years in the State Penitentiary. 
The first As3ignment of Error relied 
upon by the defendant for a reversal of said 
judgment has to do with the alleged error 
of the trial oourt in sustaining an objection 
to a question put to one of the witnesses for 
the defendant, in which the witness was asked, 
"Do you know what the general reputation of 
Ruth Dr~nens is for truth and veracity in the 
neighborhood where she resides?". The 
objection being that the question was inDompetent 
irrelevant, and immaterial. The Ruth Dhanens 
mentioned in the' question was the prosecutrix. 
The second alleged assignment of error 
has to do with the alleged error of the trial 
oourt in denying an offer made by the defendant 
to prove by certain other witnesses for the 
defendant that such other witnesses would testify 
that the general reputation of the ·nrosecutrix 
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for truth and veracity in the oornmuni ty in which 
she then resided and in the community in which 
she had previously resided was bad. These two 
assignments of error will be argued together. 
We assert that the rule of law is that the 
oredibility of any witness is always in is sue 
or at least may be made an issue by either party 
and particularly is this true in a criminal case. 
It is always the duty of a jury to ascertai· 
and determine the credibility of witnesses even 
though the opposite party has offered nothing 
to contradict the testimony. All the tests of 
aredibility should be applied to learn the exact 
truth in the matter. 
We submit that the best way to ascertain 
the truthfulness of a charge such as the one made 
against this defendant in this case is to deter-
mine if possible whether the prosecutrix has told 
the truth. So that if it oan be ascertained that 
the general reputation of the prosecutrix for 
truth and veracity is either good or bad, the 
jury is entitled to hear such testimony, and to 
oonsid~~ iT. in wBki~E up their minds as to where 
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the ulti~1ate truth with respect to the alleged 
charge is. This being the case it is clear 
that it was prejudicial error on the part of 
the trial court to refuse the defendant the 
right to go into the question of the general 
reputation of the prosecutrix for truth and 
veracity. 
The trial court seems to have been con-
fused because of the fact that under the charge 
made in the Information the jury had the rieht 
to convict the defendant upon the uncorroborated 
testimony or the prosecutrix, and because of the 
further fact that the defendant was precluded 
from offering any evidence as to what the repu-
tation or the prosecutrix was for chastity. The 
trial court seems to have been under the impress-
ion that because the prosecutrix under the law 
was not an accomplice with the defendant and there 
fore need not be corroborated that the jury were 
entitled to consider her testimony without 
regard as to whether she was telling the truth. 
This Court in the case of the State vs. 
Burns, R1 nt~h _ ?3 which was a case in which the 
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detendent was charged with oarnal knowledge of a 
female such as we have in this case, stated on 
page 75 "the Statute under which the defendant 
was oonVioted was adopted to protect young girls 
between the ages of thirteen and fifteen years 
regardless of whether such girls are chaste or 
unchaste. Their characters or moral tendencies 
respecting the prohibited acts are wholly immat-
erial. OF COURSE-, TFJi T DOES NOT PREVE11T THE 
DEFENDANT Il',1 SUCH A CASE FRO:.~ ASSAILING THE 
GENERAI REPUTArriON OF THE PROSECUTRIX FOR TRUTH 
AND VERACITY." This court in the same case 
held that the trial o ourt did not err in permi tt-
ing a witness for the State to testify as to the 
general reputation of the prosecutrix for truth 
and veracity over an objection raised by the 
defendant. 
See also State vs. Baretta, 47 Utah, 47g, 
wherein it was held that "where witnesses who 
live in the same vicinity stated that they knew 
the general reputation of defendant, who was 
oharged with larceny, for honesty and integrity 
they ar- _._ ___ .t.. ~- •-~-~-.:.~:'~~ to defendant's 
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good reputation for honesty~ 
·.·."e also cite the case of State vs. Hilberg 
22 Utah 27, wherein this Court in the Syllabus 
uses this language: "Where the crime charged is 
sexual intercourse with a prosecutrix under the 
age of consent, the intercourse constituted the 
offense whether she consented or not, and her 
good or bad character or chastity, as affecting 
the crime charged was not in issue, but her 
general reputation for truth and veracity was." 
In the case of State vs. L~rks 16 Utah 204, 
this Court held "That in impeaching the credibil-
ity of a witness, the inquiry must be confined to 
the general reputation of the witness in the 
locality referred to." That is exactly what was 
sought to be accomplished in the question put to 
defendant's v1i tness, and to which objection there-
to was sustained by the trial court, 
The court in the case last cited took 
occasion to point out just how the examination 
=>t a witness should be conducted for the purpose 
':>t testing the credibility of a witness sought 
to be imneached. and suggested the following 
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f'orm of questioning -- "Do you know what the 
general reputation of John Doe is for truth 
and veracity in the neighborhood where he 
resides?" If the question is answered in the 
affirmative the next question will be, "What 
is that reputation, good or bad?". If the 
emswer is bad, the further question may be put: 
"From that reputation would you believe him 
under oath in a matter in which he is personally 
interested?" 
In view of the offered testimony in the 
interested case and its rejection by the court, 
it is manifest that the defendant was greatly 
prejudiced by the ruling of the court, because 
in this case, there was a total lack of evidence 
tending to, corroborate the prosecutrix. It was 
a oase merely of the testimony of the Prosecutrix 
against that of the defendant: So that if the jur 
had been permitted to receive testimony that the 
general reputation of the proseoutrix for truth 
and veraci t:r was bad, it is v~ry likely that 
their verdict would have been in favor of the 
detendant. 
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We now COl'~e to the t tird and fourth 
Assignments of Error which have to do with the 
refusal of the trial court to· give defendant's 
requested Instruction No. 1, and the failure 
of the trial court to give any cautionary 
instruction to the jury. ::i:he. language of this 
court in the case of State vs. Hilberg, supra, 
is pert in en t. This language is found on page 
39, and reads as follows: "We do not overlook 
the danger attending prosecutions under this 
aet. The rules of law governing trials under 
thls statute are more stringent and less flexible 
than those applicable in other criminal cases. 
~accusation under this statute is easily made. 
rhe offense, if committed, is generally in 
seoret. The general character of the prosecutrix 
3annot be attacked. Specific acts of unchastity 
:)n her part cannot be s 1-:own. Her testimony as in 
mny other cases ·,,;here she may be an accomplice 
ices not require oorrobora tion in order to obtain 
~ull credit, and the woman who participates in the 
~ot is not criminally liable therefor. Under 
suoh oiroumstanoes the charge When made is hard 
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to disprove and difficult to defend against no 
matter how innocent the accused may be. While 
the protection of the honor and chastity of 
young women is of paramount importance to the 
state and every effort should be made to fully 
care for and protect it, yet in such prosecu-
tions full latitude should be given the accused 
to di soever the truth by cross-examination and 
otherwise, so as to enable him to defend against 
any unjust aauusation." 
We admit that defendant's requested 
lnstruotion No. 1 is not ver:_r artfully drawn 
lUt we submit that in View of the requested 
.~truotion, the trial court should have given 
l oautionary instruction on its o<vvn account, 
ven if it could not give the instruction as 
equested. 
The giving of a cautionary instruction 
Y the court would have been very desirable 
~ would have been a distinct help to the jury, 
ld particularly would this have been true had 
le oourt admitted the evidence offered by the 
tttndent ~lr11!1 ,. Pi~6&4-.bili ty of the 
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proseautrix, and referred to in Assignments of 
Error ~~Tos. 1 and 2. It would have been proper 
tor the court to have given an instruction in 
substantially the following form, to-wit: 
"You are instructed that while it is the rule of 
law that the defendant may be#convicted in a 
case like this, upon the uncorroborated testi-
mony of the prosecutrix, still you are instructed 
that you should always act upon such testimony 
mth great care and caution, and subject it to 
careful examination in the light of all other 
evidence in the case, and particularly is this 
rule ap licable in cases of this character 
where the charge is easily made and hard to ('_,c. 
defend against, and you ought not to convict 
upon such testimony alone, unless, after a care-
ful examination of such testimony you are satis-
fied beyond all reasonable doubt that it is true." 
The propriety and necessity of giving such 
instruction as the one suggested above in this 
class ot cases is su )ported by a number or· 
American decisions. Some courts hold however, 
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that the giving of such instruction is improper 
because it states no rule of law, but is a 
mere argument, and constitutes an invasion of 
the province of the jury. 
We cite the following cases in support of 
these Assignments of Error: 
People vs. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 65 Am.Dec.506; 
Oennere vs. State, 47 Wis. 523, 2 NW 1143; 
Reynolds vs. State 27 Neb. 90, 42 NW 903; and 
20 Am. State Rep. 659; 
People vs. Rangod 112 Cal. 669, 44 Pac. 1071 • 
This last case holds that the giving of 
such instruction in a case where the testimony of 
the prosecutrix is oorrobora ted by other 
!Vidence is improper. 
This court in the oase of State vs. 
tutledge 227 Pac. 479 held that the refusal 
;o give such instruction was not error, but in 
:iving 1 ts reasons for so holding pointed out 
he toJ.lowing facts which obtained in that case, 
amely: 1 - That the case at bar did not rest upon 
he sole testimony of the prosecutrix. 
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2- That her testimony was supported 
by other material facts and circumstances proved 
by other witnesses. 
3- That it was shown that for several 
months previous to the time of the offense 
charged the defendant had been paying regular 
atter.tion to the :prosecutrix, visiting with her 
e.t her home, and taking her out riding with him 
on numerous occasions; that he represented 
himself as unmarried, and conducted himself as 
a suitor; that he was seen on a previous occasion 
in an automobile with his arm around the prose-
outrix; that he was with the prosecutrix on the 
day in question; that after the alleged offense 
the defendant approached the parents of the 
prosecutrix and offered to "settle the rna tter 
by payment of money and marrying the girl." 
He submit that in the instant case there 
is a total lack of any evidence such as that 
~ointed out in the oase last cited, with the 
sole exception or evidence to. the effect that the 
ietendant was in the presence of the prosecutrix 
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on the day in question. So it would seem to us 
that in view of what this court said in the case 
of State vs. Ruthledge, supra, it was error for 
the trial court in the instant case to refuse 
and fail to give a cautionary instruction. 
For t~1e trial court to give 1 ts stock 
instruction to the effect that the jury was the 
sole judge of the credibility_ of the witnesses 
whloh ir.cluded the prosecutrix was not sufficient, 
and particularly in view of the fact that the 
trial court refused the defendant the right 
that was his to impeach the credibility of the 
prosecutrix by showing that her general repu-
tation for truth and veracity was bad. 
We come now to our final Assignrr1ent of 
~rror, to the effect that the trial court erred 
~n denying the defendant's rno ti on for a new trial, 
,articularly in view of ground No. 3 of said 
loti on, which was, "That the jury had been guiltf 
,f misconduct by which a fair and due consideration 
f the case may have been prevented." Of 
curse we are aware of the general rule of law 
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whioh l:olds that a juror may not impeach the 
verdict by his own affidavit. 
rr~--_is court in the case of State vs. }.Eellor 
73 Utah 104, 272 Pao. 635, has held that the 
granting or refusing a new trial for a juror's 
misoonduot is discretionary with the trial court 
am will not be reviewed unless abused. 
Ir. the case just cited the record showed 
that the alleged misconduct of the juror consist-
ed of his going to sleep· several times for short 
intervals, but that he was fully aware of all the 
testimony that was offered, and that he fully 
understood all the testimony. In the instant 
case however it appears from the affidavit of 
the juror, Fred 0. Palmer, in support of the 
Motion for a New Trial, that said juror was the 
foreman ot the jury which tried and convicted 
the defendant; that he never was at any time 
oonvinoed that the defendant was guilty of the 
oharge for vrhi ch the defendant was on trial; 
that he held out for a verdict of not guilty 
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as long as r_is hea 1 th and strength would :permit; 
that he was not -aell, being afflicted with a 
~erious heart ailment, and that he was under a 
doctor's care; that when he gave his vote for 
guilty in this case there was a doubt in his 
mind as to the guilt of the defendant; that he 
would have eont inued to vote not guilty if it 
had not been that he was in suoh a weakened 
oonc_i tion, and feared for his own life if he had 
to continue longer in such deliberation as was 
bei:n_g c.ondueted by the said jury; that there 
is still at this tire (the date of the affidavit, 
Ootober 6, 1939) a doubt in his mind as to the 
defendant being guilty of the orime for which 
the jury returned the verdict of guilty. 
It seems to us that the conduct detailed 
by said affidavit constitutes misconduct as 
defined by the express language of the statute 
as grounds for a new trial. Section 103-39-3 
Subdi vision 3 of the R. S. Utah, 1933, reads as 
follows: "When the jury has separated without 
leave of the oo urt after retiring to deli berate 
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upon their verdict, OR HA"VE BEEN GUil~TY OF ANY 
CONDUCT BY WHICH ) .. FAIR Al,,.D DUE CONSIDERATION OF 
When a juror states in effect that he was 
forced or impelled to join with other jurors 
because he feared for his life if he had to 
continue further deliberations with the jury 
and for that reason abandoned his convictions 
with respect to the defendant's guilt in order 
that he could ccnclude his services as a juror 
and get to his doctor for treatment, he is to 
our way of thinking, guilty o~ the worst kind 
of miscoLduct. Of course he could have advised 
the court of his condition, and the court would 
probably have made arrangements for him to get 
medical attention, and then permit him to give 
further consideration to the case. But because 
he did not adopt the orderly and consistent way 
or handling the matter should hot be visited 
upon the head of the defendant. 
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7fe have made a search of the cases and 
have been unable to find a oase in point, but 
even so, it does seem to us that this sort of 
misconduct should be held by this court to 
constitute such misconduct on the part of a 
juror as would e:::.title the defendant to a new 
trial, and that the failure of the trial court 
to grant defendant's motion for a new trial 
should be held to be an abuse of discretion. 
Received a 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~,tZ_~ 
copy ot th~t:~!7~~;iet 
this /,( day of December 1940. 
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